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“The People Watching at Home” 
An analysis of political disagreement in a public inquiry event 
 
 
Tom W. Underwood and Jo Angouri 




This paper explores disagreement practice in political discourse and specifically in the under 
explored public inquiry communicative event and specifically in the select-committee 
hearing. We revisit earlier work on theorising disagreement to expand and extend our 
understanding of its contextual nature, particularly in relation to the making of ideology. 
 
Public inquiries combine the characteristics of professional meetings with 
characteristics of political discourse. They are typified by hybridised and ambiguous role 
expectations which participants negotiate in and through (potentially competing) practices in 
doing the ideological work demanded by the policy process. In this context, disagreement 
emerges as expected and key to the performance of the interactants’ situated and 
explicit/semi-permanent roles as professional politicians.  
 
By applying Critical Interactional Sociolinguistic analysis within a wider frame of 
audience design, we demonstrate the importance of the ideological role of disagreement to 
the policy process. We argue that further attention needs to be given to the policy talk in 
meso-level political events, such as the public inquiry, which connect the ideological (macro) 
political domains of human activity with the (micro) here and now of talk. 
 We close the paper with directions for further research.  
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The linguistic community’s conception of disagreement has long since moved on from seeing 
this interactional phenomenon as a negative and relationally damaging act, to exploring its 
wide range of interactional functions and perceptions across communicative contexts. But it 
is still rare that assessments of disagreement go further than a consideration of its relational 
contributions. In this paper we argue that disagreement is a fundamentally performative act 
for professional politicians in the doing of policy, so much so that we conclude disagreement 
to be a linguistic resource for both being political and for making issues political. By taking 
an explicitly critical approach to interactional sociolinguistic analysis of the policy process, 
disagreement per se emerged as a clear locus of ideological negotiation between the 
participants in our dataset as we explored the performativity of policy process talk. The 
under-researched  public inquiry event is typified by interactional acts which have profound 
ideological ramifications. The growing public visibility it receives, increases the symbolic 
capacity of such policy interactions to shape hegemonic narratives.  
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 The paper also acts as a mandate for examining interaction in the exploration of 
critical social and political issues, in particular vis-à-vis policy “meso-levels” which connect 
the macro political and social domains of human activity with the ‘here and now’ of talk. 
Ethnographic research into broadcast talk provides a useful starting place in explaining 
participants’ interactional choices within this dynamic and high-stakes particular political 
(interactional and material) space. It also furthers our understanding of the contextual nature 
of disagreement practice which has not yet been considered, at least not explicitly, in relation 
to the expectations of the multiple audiences that impact directly and indirectly on the design 
of interactive political encounters. 
 The paper is structured in four core parts; we open the paper with a discussion of our 
research locus, the policy environment and provide a reading of the current sociolinguistic 
approaches to disagreement. We then turn to our methodological approaches and provide the 
analysis of two excerpts that illustrate our core theoretical stance. We close the paper with 
revisiting audience design and suggesting a framework for future studies on political 
discourse and disagreement.  
 
 
2. The UK Parliament Select Committee hearing 
 
 
Public inquiry events are exceptional in their demonstration of ideology as something 
socially negotiated, and simultaneously of interaction as ideologically dependent for its 
meaning. We understand them as a meso-level of political activity defined by membership, 
goals, practices, norms and materialities, connecting the ideological order to the situated 
micro moment of interaction. Evidently, a meso-level is an analytical construct. The ‘micro-
meso-macro’ metaphor is an analytical artefact deployed to unpack complex phenomena and 
as such is useful for zooming in on the research question we seek to address; we use it here to 
identify hybrid or relatively undefined communicative event in which the synthesis between 
micro level linguistic features and macro-level ideologies are particularly dynamic and highly 
productive.  
We explore the UK Parliament Select Committee hearing as a meso-level within the 
policy process for the analytical opportunity it offers to a critical interactional perspective. 
Select committees are groups charged by parliament to investigate either specific issues or 
issues of their choosing within their areas of responsibility. They are typically formed of 
several cross-party MPs or Lords (or both) whose membership is voted in by parliament but 
generally reflects the balance of party seats in parliament (Marshall 2020). Whilst select 
committees vary in the way in which they work and the things they try to achieve, they all 
largely conduct inquiries, publish reports and interrogate ministers by gathering a variety of 
oral and written evidence. This evidence gathering is largely enabled by its power to call on 
witnesses to a select committee hearing. This involves a panel of select committee members 
who, led by the select committee chair, take turns to interview witnesses. By consequence of 
being one of parliament’s primary tools for holding government to account, select 
committees play a significant role in the UK policy making process. 
Hajer’s (1995) path-breaking work on the use of discourse analysis in sustainability 
policy demonstrates the usefulness of the policy process as an area for analysis. More than 
simply series of events in which solutions are found for societal problems, he argues the 
policy process to be where society manages social conflict; its participants are not simply 
searching for the solutions to problems, but they are primarily looking to socially define the 
problems before any such solutions can be found. It is this notion of the social definition of 
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the policy problem that we are interested in exploring vis-à-vis disagreement. More 
specifically, how the ideological work required of policy players is done through 
disagreement as a characteristic of the public inquiry interactional space. Hajer pictures the 
policy process as useful for understanding the source of many dominant societal discourses. 
For example, he claims that the 1984 inquiry held by the House of Commons Select 
Committee for the Environment (now the Environmental Audit Committee) into acid rain, an 
emblematic environmental issue of 1980s Britain, was a watershed moment in changing 
public environmental perception and policy. More specifically though, it is the process of 
social construction that he promotes uncovering; rich qualitative analysis of policy 
documents, hearings, etc. can provide insight into what constitutes hegemonic discourses and 
how the policy process itself contributes to their development. For such reasons, policy 
analysts are no strangers to discourse analytical approaches (Fairclough 2013). 
 The vast majority of work on policy discourse (and political discourse generally) 
relies on analyses of written texts such as government reports, corporate reports, news articles 
and NGO statements (see Livesey 2002; Rydin 1999) or ritualised spoken ones such as 
speeches and television interviews (see Montgomery 2007; Wodak 2009). More recently, 
linguists have frequented more atypical contexts such as social media posts (Kreis 2017). 
However, seldom does this extend to naturally occurring talk and interaction between 
politicians outside the parliament, and rarely within policy making contexts such as public 
inquiries, despite their profound implications for legislation and public consciousness (Buttny 
2015). Whilst such contexts are emerging as areas for ethnographic research (e.g., Buttny 
2015; Murphy 2019) the assessment of such talk in relation to its regulation of social conflict 
and by extension ideology construction is something that has yet to be addressed. We will 
return to this in the next section. 
 Though public audiences are allowed to attend most select committee meetings, albeit 
in restricted numbers, it is only with online availability of recorded select committees’ 
meetings that they have become so publicly available. Policy process talk is, in this way, an 
area of emerging public visibility and interest in the same way that many other domains and 
processes of governance which were previously behind closed doors are receiving greater 
media attention (for example, Trump’s first impeachment proceedings). We believe, and this 
paper attempts to show how, this growing availability has led to a hybridisation of the public 
inquiry space (interactional and material) where many features of broadcast talk and the news 
interview now apply.  
Political beings are thus presented with new and challenging professional events 
within which to construct their identities whilst negotiating competing norms and 
expectations. These include emerging requirements for engagement with stakeholders and the 
public. How interactions are designed for the benefit of absent and overhearing audiences has 
long been the interest of research into broadcast talk (Hutchby 2005) and this should apply no 
less to policy inquiry communicative events. A central tenet of broadcast talk is that there is a 
potentially infinitely large audience, formed by a diverse set of clusters; how talk plays out 
can itself be the determinant of the size and nature of this audience. A well-researched 
example of this that bears relevance to the policy inquiry event is the political news interview 
(Montgomery 2007) which is often intended to produce quotable opinions and analysis from 
politicians in a way that can be used to generate further news which itself attracts an audience 
(Blum-Kulka 1983; Ekström 2001). 
 Consequently, the interactional design within the policy process is highly 
ideologically productive because of its direct effect upon the construction of policy; yet with 
ambiguous norms due to the potential presence of an overhearing audience whose makeup is 
somewhat reliant on the design of the talk itself. Thus we consider the select committee 
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meeting to be a specific space, interactional and material (Mondada 2011) and meso-level 
event for how it bridges together multiple and potentially diverse communicative practices, 
thereby representing opportunities to explore the relationship between a) macro politics and 
the formation of hegemonic ideologies and b) political role performance enacted in and 




3. Critical Interactional Sociolinguistics and policy analysis 
 
3.1 Critical Interactional Sociolinguistics (CIS) 
 
To explore how talk is performative in this emerging hybrid political/professional context, we 
are adopting a Critical Interactional Sociolinguistic approach to analysis. Interactional 
approaches are concerned with the ways in which social reality is enacted and negotiated in 
situ, through mapping the architecture of interactions. Interactional sociolinguistics (IS), led 
primarily by the work of Gumperz, explores both “content and metapragmatic or indexical 
information about content” (Gumperz and Cook-Gumperz 2008, 537, emphasis added) to 
interpret how speakers “do” interaction in potentially communicatively ambiguous situations. 
Whilst IS facilitates explaining the nature of talk in relation to the beliefs at play in a given 
context, rarely has IS research been applied to its full potential in exploring the relationship 
between talk and  the production and maintenance of hegemonic ideologies. This, however, is 
not inherent to IS, as Gumperz was particularly interested in the politics of language and 
power asymmetries (Rampton 2016). As has been argued elsewhere (Angouri and Wodak 
2014), IS can be fruitfully combined with Critical Discursive approaches, and particularly 
Discourse Historical Analysis, for capturing macro/meso/micro political phenomena.  
 Our approach to IS intends to be explicitly critical by exploring the synthesis between 
the ideological issues at stake and the interactional practice of the speakers in the policy 
process. Whilst much IS research has a critical element in its ability to question the 
ideological bases upon which the social order is built, it is rare that such research directly 
addresses the interrelationship between participant’s interactional strategies and their belief 
systems (or the systems they formally represent in the case of professional politicians). Such 
a critical perspective to interaction is also absent from the little existing research into policy 
talk. Our paper makes a contribution to this agenda.  
 Turning to the specific event of the select committee hearing; the participants must 
perform their roles as legitimate professionals in the definition of policy in relation to the 
ideological issues of the policy problem at stake. Consequently, this means that notions of 
professional roles are, perhaps unsurprisingly, dependent upon the policy issue at hand. 
However, the question of what is professional in the case of policy creation is itself a political 
question. As such, participants compete to manage this tension between the professional and 
the P/political. The definition of role expectations is itself part of the ideological work that 
the policy process therefore requires. Conversely, as policy problems are the foundations of 
professional identities, ideological policy contests can themselves be negotiated in 
disagreement about roles and their performance. In short, professional roles are themselves 
ideologically performative of the policy question at hand, whatever it may be. Through 
observing the interactional management of roles in the process of the social definition of 
policy we can, therefore, understand how hegemonic discourses are drawn upon, reinforced 
or challenged in the practice of interaction, as and when they are made relevant by speakers 




3.2 Application to policy events 
 
A CIS approach is integral to the analysis of policy interaction specifically because the 
interactional positions of political beings are so reliant upon hegemonic macro ideologies. 
Naturally, their professional role is explicitly defined by the ideologies that they subscribe to. 
CIS also helps to explore how the social order as negotiated in interaction contributes to the 
emergence of wider hegemonic discourses outside of the political sphere. Building off the 
back of Hajer’s (1995) conceptualisation of the policy process as primarily a mechanism for 
the social definition of problems, spontaneous interaction represents an opportunity to 
explore the discursive struggle of social definition that is less visible in the more formalised 
and edited outputs of policy. The deictic practice of designating interactional positions is 
“social construction par excellence” according to Hanks (1990, 7) and when this is done vis-
à-vis core ideological policy contests, interactional practices gain ideological significance 
that trickle into the wider public sphere, as in Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) orientation to the 
social as being the product of political practice. 
 Richer understandings of how discourses emerge and are socially constructed mark 
the wider contributions that CIS can make to policy analysis (and perhaps to other critical 
discourse approaches) where macro-level narratives are typically the analytical goal. 
Comparatively, our attention is oriented towards exploring how communicative mechanisms 
of government shape the policy process. We will next turn to the role of disagreement in 




Disagreement was initially regarded within linguistic research as a largely undesirable or 
negative communicative act (Sifianou 2012). Early politeness theory researchers, most 
notably Brown & Levinson (1987), portrayed disagreement as a potential imposition upon the 
positive face of an interlocutor, and thus within much of the subsequent work emerging from 
politeness theory, agreement is seen as being preferable in interaction (Levinson 1983). 
Meanwhile conversation analysts also claimed that disagreement is “dispreferred” by the 
language system itself which tends to elicit agreement on behalf of the interlocutor (Sacks 
1973/1987). At base, both of these theoretical underpinnings posit a relationship between 
preference and agreement and regard conflict or disagreement as marginal in interaction 
(Bousfield 2014). Since Schifrin’s (1984) seminal analysis of argument in Jewish 
communities, which depicted disagreement as a vehicle for expressing solidarity and 
sociability amongst group members, there has developed a substantial body of postmodern 
linguistic work exploring the great variation in disagreement practice in differing cultures and 
contexts (see Sifianou 2012 for a summary). Associations such as dispreferred or relationally 
damaging, which initially helped to define the concept, have largely been dismissed as a 
priori concepts alongside an increase in focus on the range of acceptability and functions of 
disagreement across contexts and local practices. Within this, disagreement has both been 
explored as the “way things are done” (Angouri 2012, 1566) and as a ‘‘necessary part of the 
process of reaching agreement’’ (Bargiela-Chiappini and Harris 1997, 193). These are 
particularly important contextual considerations to studies on disagreement in institutional 
and professional settings, as is relevant to our specific focus on a policy institution. Examples 
include work by Myers (1998), who demonstrates how academic seminars and other 
particular focus group interactions appear to feature ritualised and expected disagreement. 
Similarly, our previous work on problem solving talk in meetings (Angouri 2012) 
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distinguishes between disagreements which are considered inherent to getting things done 
(unmarked disagreement) and those which carry greater relational and identity based 
implications (marked disagreement). 
However, as Georgakopoulou (2012) suggests, discursive approaches to disagreement 
have, if anything, only made it harder to say what is and is not disagreement. This complexity 
of disagreement research lies somewhat in parallel with the wider challenge of generalising 
patterns situated in specific contexts, but with a concept so polysemous and ambiguous as 
disagreement this challenge is particularly acute. Consequently, researchers still lack the 
theoretical frameworks and clear study goals to approach disagreement in interaction beyond 
variation. We believe that certain aspects of this problem can be answered by adopting a 
critical approach to disagreement that explores the relationship between ideologies and 
language and interactional processes. We probe this further in the next section. 
 
3.3.1 A CIS approach to disagreement 
In our analysis of disagreement, we are proposing an epistemological reorientation to move 
beyond the relational considerations that politeness research associated with the phenomenon 
and which are deeply embedded in disciplinary theory. We believe that disagreement 
research is somewhat held back by its attempt to shake off the lingering influence of earlier 
politeness theory approaches (Brown and Levinson 1987) which held relational 
considerations in high esteem for the evaluation of interaction. Whilst not denying the 
relational impact of disagreement as an important measure for understanding the social order 
in interaction, what is yet to be achieved in discursive approaches is thorough consideration 
of how the management and interpretation of disagreement in interaction is related to the 
ideologies which participants are negotiating. 
 In fact, we believe that evaluating disagreement practices in terms of the synthesis 
between interactional performance and ideological meanings gives a clear epistemological 
basis upon which to assess interactional strategies that better explains contextual variation. 
Disagreement for us (drawing on “opposing views” in Angouri and Locher 2012) suggests 
that the differentiation between whether utterances (and larger stretches of discourse) are in 
agreement or disagreement is by consequence of whether the views that they manifest 
ideologically align or dis-align. Yet, the indexical link between the interactional practice of 
delivering a view, and the view itself is a complex, contextually dependent one. We interpret 
this relationship within the select committee hearing event in terms of audience design; this 
represents an aspect of context which, despite its large sociolinguistic body of work, has not 
been fully considered within disagreement research. (The closest examples to this are a small 
number of studies exploring third party effects on disagreement, see Sifianou 2012). 
Disagreement is consequently presented as a resource used by participants in their attempts to 
do audience design which we interpret as a key part of the ideological work demanded by the 
policy process and has implications for macro and party politics. 
Disagreement as a specific interactional practice is the focus of our attention within 
the communicative mechanisms of government because, we argue, it is fundamentally 
ideologically performative in the policy context. In this way, to disagree is to be political and 
to disagree in line with party stance is expected. It is, indeed, hardly innovative to suggest 
that disagreement is ubiquitous in governmental politics and democratic debate (M. Haggith 
1993) and disagreement has long-established significance in political science. 
Schattschneider’s (1960) seminal critique of pluralism in democratic societies depicts 
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conflict1 as either exploited or suppressed by politicians with the intention of engaging or 
disengaging the audience around a particular issue. Although his general theory has 
undergone significant adjustment, he precursors our notion of disagreement as a performative 
practice. He  calls conflict the “mobilisation of bias” (1960, 71) and by this envisages conflict 
as the political practice by which subjective attention is given to an issue with intent to give it 
political significance. Whilst this is a correlation we largely agree with, Schattschneider’s 
(1960) explanation of this falls short of much empirical backing. 
 He recognised disagreement practice as reliant on the presence of audiences, but more 
importantly as an action that intends to shape audiences. As vicarious advocates in the policy 
process, politicians are to appear to reflect their voting base’s concerns in their 
disagreements, yet simultaneously they also act to shape them. This particularly comes to the 
fore when new problems arise and require social definition in the way that Hajer 
conceptualises the policy process. Given the audience’s shaping role of broadcast talk in 
political interviews discussed earlier, we posit that disagreement should be considered as a 
key function in the design of interaction for politicians to both attract certain audiences and 





Our analysis focuses on data drawn from a single hearing (see UK Parliament 2018) which 
formed part of a wider inquiry into the sustainability of the fashion industry by the 
Environmental Audit Committee (EAC). This hearing featured the giving of evidence by 
several government ministers to the select committee panel, and was one of four hearings 
which comprised the inquiry, the other hearings featuring witnesses from a range of 
stakeholder groups such as NGOs, industry and academia. Whilst we were interested in 
exploring the function of disagreement practices within the single politicians’ hearing, we 
took an ethnographic approach to the overall inquiry in order to ensure that our analysis of 
disagreement practices was guided by an understanding of the ideological positions of the 
main stakeholder groups to the inquiry. Video recordings of hearings along with all written 
evidence provided to the inquiry can be accessed on the UK government website and is thus 
in the public domain (UK Parliament 2019) though we did also attend one of the hearings in 
person.2 Although our research is not based on longitudinal physical presence in a 
community, we take a holistic view of ethnographic methodology and consider our 
immersive approach in line with the principles of the ethnographic tradition with its emphasis 
of developing an emic understanding of the community and its norms (Angouri 2018).  
 This hearing also demonstrates a high-stakes interaction; one of our first observations 
was that it featured significantly higher levels of explicit disagreement than the other 
hearings, despite discussion of the same issues. As the politicians on the EAC question 
government ministers on government policy creation and enforcement, both witnesses’ 
government positions as well as the creation of government policy are at stake and provide 
the backdrop for the discursive struggle to define the nature of the problem at hand. This 
                                                     
1 Whilst conflict is not necessarily disagreement, the cross-disciplinary difference between these is a largely 
terminological one. For further discussion on distinctions between conflict and disagreement see Angouri 
(2012). 
2 For more information on the role of the UK Parliament see (UK Parliament n.d.), the UK Government see (UK 
Government n.d.), Select Committees (Institute for Government 2020), and Public Inquiries (Institute for 
Government 2018).   
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inquiry generally also already aroused significant notice when it was established (e.g. Laville 
2019; Smith 2018; Smithers 2018) and one of its hearings (not the one at the focus of our 
analysis) was attended by a record-high select committee audience made open by public 
invitation, particularly to professional stakeholders across sectors (UK Parliament 2018). 
This contributed to abnormally high attention given to the inquiry, and with it increasingly 
higher stakes surrounding the potential ideological impact of its interactions as participants 
were aware of increased likelihood of their hearings being themselves watched and evaluated 
by relevant stakeholders. 
 Our intention is not to provide a summary of the ideologies and practices at play in 
this hearing (we do this elsewhere Underwood and Angouri, in prep.), but an exploration into 
the interrelationship between interactional roles and ideological contests at stake through 
disagreement. Consequently, we are more interested in the effects of these higher stakes upon 
participants’ interactional choices. We will end with reflections into why the interactional 
performance of disagreement is so profoundly performative within this policy event, and, 
consequently, propose an analytical model that requires further application to policy. 
 
 
5. Data analysis 
 
5.1 Excerpt A: “I don’t think you can um get away with that Minister” 
 
Here, we explore how competing interactional expectations of role performance are 
negotiated by participants in order to do policy work and how this can be explained by wider 
ideological tensions. Early on in the hearing, there is discursive struggle over the rights and 
responsibilities of the participants to either request and/or provide information on purported 
workers’ rights breaches in Leicester. At face, this appears to be a contest in defining their 
professional roles and what is interactionally required/expected of these within the context of 
the hearing. Whilst on the one hand both participants are Members of Parliament, the context 
of the select committee hearing demands participants to pursue professional investigation into 
the issue of inquiry that is to some degree a “neutral” assessment of the performance of 
activities of government.  
Participants are balancing both roles as politicians within the wider context of the 
policy process, and roles as professionals within this specific interactional and material space 
of the select committee hearing. Creagh is both the Chair of the Environmental Audit Select 
Committee and a Labour Party MP, whilst Tolhurst is a witness to the committee and a 
Conservative Party Minister. In light of this, we see the participants negotiate their 
professional roles within the hearing as a way in which to do political, and by extension 
ideological, work as they try to socially define whether the issue of workers’ rights is a policy 
problem or an enforcement problem.  
 The political agendas of the respective political parties are a core part of the wider 
context within which this interaction takes place. In line with Hajer (1995), the extent to 
which something is relevant to the policy process is much the preoccupation of policy 
workers as they attempt to socially define the nature of the policy problem. This occasionally 
comes to the fore when participants begin to attempt to undermine each other’s performance 
of professional roles by insinuating their underlying political motives for doing so.  
 As we show below, the interactional performance of the participants is teetering on 
the edge between professional and political as they attempt to do ideological work whilst 
staying within the bounds of the select committee meso-level of activity – and its assumed 
neutrality. Professional roles are, in this way, the interactional resources that they use to 
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establish who gets a say on this policy issue; this is ideologically significant given that they 
are themselves symbolic representations of ideological positions. Importantly, this is 
something that is facilitated by the nature of the audience to the communicative event. The 
publicly available and disseminatable nature of the select committee hearing endows the 
interactions within it political potential. That the extent of this potential is open for 
interpretation allows for such political / professional ambiguity. It is the political opportunity 
of this professional setting that allows for the ideological potency of otherwise professional 
roles, especially when the nature of professional roles has such ideological significance in the 

























































how many (.) joint workings are currently going on in Leicester↓ 
yeah  a-as   I’ve   as   I’ve   already:   er   said to er   you   umm um er Chair 
I: um (.) will   not   comment   on    ongoing   investigations   into   
Leicester=              [in      regards      to              well  I-] 
                =I’m not [asking you to give us the detail I’m] asking you to give 
us the number= 
                                  =well [I-I’m]              
                                             [one↑] (.) five↑ twenty five↑ [a hundred↓] 
                                                                                                    [I’m (.) I’ve-] 
I’m telling you that I will not go into detail about the particular-the 
particular enforcement↑ work↓(.) that is being carried on (.) er joint 
inve-investigations in Leicester at this moment= 
                                                                                 =I don’t think you can: um  
get away↑ with that Minister↓= 
                                                         =well I’m afrai:d I need to because as you 
will appreciate they a:re sensitive ongoing investigations (.) u:mm with 
an-and it’s quite right (.) um that that information is not given publicly (.) 
[at this stage] 
((Repeated request for ‘numbers’ and not ‘detail’)) 
Heh as I(h)’ve said er chair y’know they’re ongoing↑ investigations↓  I’m 
[not     prepared   I’m  not    prepared    as   minister  
     [HOW MANY (.) SO THAT’S TWO↓ (.) THERE’S MORE THAN ONE↓(.)  
to   sit     here] to go into detail about those ongoing investigations (.) 
THERE’S TWO↓] 
((provides detailed justification)) I (.) cannot↓ (.) go into live 
investigations (.) and will not get draw:n (.) on that matter here↓ 
(1) I think that’s absolutely extraordinary I think the people watching at 
home will draw their own conclusions on that↓ 
 
Between lines 21-32, Creagh constructs an interactional context which demands Tolhurst to 
provide information into the claimed investigations in Leicester on the basis of Tolhurst’s 
role as a witness, and simultaneously cements her interactional right to request such 
information through indexing her own role as chair to the inquiry. Tolhurst rejects this 
through an alternative rationalisation of the rights and duties of her professional role as 
witness and Minister. There is, therefore, disagreement about what is interactionally 
expected/justified of these roles in this context. In line 21 Creagh’s question comes after 
several minutes of prior disagreement around the same issue and is delivered in a way as such 
to index the authority of a Chair or judge of an inquiry to demand information; the pause after 
“how many” works to stress what is interactionally being demanded of Tolhurst so as to 
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provide no leeway for an alternative response that does not deliver this specifically solicited 
information. The utterance ends with a drop in intonation that suggests authority in the 
question; rising intonation is typically associated with questions (i.e., requests for 
information, action, response, etc.) in British English common norms which also carry with 
them an element of acknowledgement about the imposition of asking a question, whereas the 
drop in intonation here implies a right to ask the question, and with it a responsibility on 
behalf of the witness to give that information. This excerpt is preceded by a long period 
(about 100 lines) of ambiguity interactionally achieved through lack of complicity in 
responses from Tolhurst in which she has not provided the information solicited by Creagh. 
Only in the context of this pre-established interactional dynamic does Creagh’s utterance 
contribute to a wider performance of a professional role of the Chair in demanding both 
“simplicity” and “order” in response and asking for it in a way that suggests overriding 
authority in her right to determine the interactional responsibilities of the participants. 
However, the soliciting of information in such a way also presupposes Tolhurst as someone 
who knows the answer to the question, and more importantly perhaps as someone who should 
know it and be able to give it. This forms the basis of the ideological contest in this 
interaction, as whether this information can and should be provided determines the extent to 
which it is relevant to the definition of the policy problem at hand. Creagh’s strategy also 
places the ideological contest firmly in relation to the audience. Her approach is typical of 
contemporary news interviewers which according to Montgomery (2007, 178-9) embrace a 
“no-nonsense, non-deferential manner” in order to “ventriloquise on behalf of a presumed 
sceptical public”, thereby attempting to create solidarity with them by soliciting information 
in the way that they would and for their benefit. 
In contrast, Tolhurst declines the information request by Creagh (lines 22-24) but 
relies on a professional justification with which to do this. As such, she takes disagreement 
with Creagh on a basis of role performance and requirements rather than political 
disagreement; by fore fronting professional considerations she diverts Creagh’s attempt to 
make the information relevant for the definition of policy. Tolhurst’s response in lines 22-24 
continues to perform the interactional dynamic that Creagh has already begun to build yet 
attempts to undermine its importance in favour of her professional obligations not to provide 
the information that Creagh requests. Whilst not denying the authority of the Chair to request 
such information she provides an implicit professional rational for not doing so. Her use of 
the address “Chair” in line 23 further promulgates the chair-witness dynamic that Creagh has 
begun to create and serves as a form of tacit agreement with the implicit reasoning of 
Creagh’s initial request. Acknowledgment of this interactional dynamic gives Tolhurst’s 
subsequent declination of the request for the information justification as a right of a witness 
to this inquiry to withhold such information as she is somewhat cooperating with Creagh’s 
interactional framing, if not her specific demands. The declination comes in the form of “I: 
um (.) will not comment on ongoing investigations” in line 23 and indexes a professionalism 
in her rejection of Creagh’s request, rather than a direct contradiction of Creagh’s right to 
request the information. “Not comment” carries connotations with declining requests to 
journalists for information for purposes which are sacrosanct, in line with Tolhurst’s 
professional obligations. This could also be seen to undermine Creagh’s questioning as 
almost journalistic, and thus whilst not denying the Chair – Witness dynamic, it undermines 
the strength of Creagh’s right to receive such information. Likewise, it suggests that the 
aspect of Tolhurst’s professional role in protecting the investigation of the workers’ rights 
issues at hand is in fact of greater importance than the aspect of her role to provide 
information about it as a witness. As a result, as Creagh tries to force Tolhurst to provide this 
information on professional grounds, Tolhurst reacts by providing an alternative nuance to 
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her professional responsibility which expresses that she can in fact not provide this 
information, in order to maintain professionalism. 
The participants have thus met in stalemate in a disagreement about what can be 
required by either professional role, which requires further work on both parts to bolster their 
interactional demands. In lines 25-26 Creagh develops her position as the Chair of the select 
committee; it is not just her opinion that Tolhurst must provide this information, but she is 
acting on behalf of the Committee to request such information. This is done through a 
repeated pronoun construction “I’m not asking you to give us the detail I’m asking you to 
give us the number”. This also claims that Tolhurst’s professional role does not prevent her 
from providing at least a number and talking over Tolhurst’s attempt to respond she proposes 
a series of numbers that work to patronise the nature of Tolhurst’s ability to provide an 
answer by demonstrating the communicative ‘ease’ of stating a number, in this way 
attempting to undermine Tolhurst’s competence as a witness. In contrast, Tolhurst further 
bolsters the importance of her professional obligations not to provide any information (e.g.,  
strong emphasis on “enforcement work” in line 31 to illustrate its priority over the select 
committee hearing) and denies the crude simplicity of Creagh’s demand for a number (i.e., a 
number is detail). 
Up until this point the participants have largely been acting exclusively within 
professional roles as reference points upon which to base their disagreement. To contrast, 
Creagh’s strategy in lines 33-34 is to refer to the implicit political work being done, by 
actually suggesting that Tolhurst’s strategy to use this “professional role” as an “excuse” or 
justification  not to provide the information is actually a political tactic. This is done through 
a number of devices, first “get away” which references explicit political strategies and 
moralistic associations of potentially corrupt politicians, and “minister” which explicitly 
addresses her political role in government (and is also a nod to House of Commons talk) and 
finally the hesitation in the form of “can: um” supposes a sort of daring cheek or irony as 
Creagh breaks role in suddenly claiming that really Tolhurst’s interactional position on this is 
in fact not professionally justified, but politically directed. This effects to criticise Tolhurst’s 
role performance itself, suggesting that she is not playing the select committee “game”, but in 
doing so this constitutes a political action on Creagh’s part; to suggest Tolhurst is acting with 
political motivations is itself a political action. A similar pattern is then almost repeated again 
in lines 35-62 in which there is continued disagreement around what is and can be expected 
of the professional roles in the circumstance, and again ends with a discrete reference by 
Creagh in lines 61-62 which indicates that Tolhurst is doing her disagreement about the 
professional role for a political purpose. “The people watching at home” suggests that 
Tolhurst’s professional guise will not fool the audience who will interpret her interactional 
choices as clearly political. These slightly more direct references to political behaviour act as 
nods towards the (potential) presence of a wider public audience. Furthermore, they are also 
attempts to underline one another’s attempted alignments towards the audience in designing 
their responses. Because there is ambiguity regarding the position of the audience’s role in 
the conversation (being not present), this means that they both need to claim a stance 
regarding the extent to which they are talking to one another with the intention to influence 
one another, or the extent to which they are talking to one another with the intention to 
influence the audience. Likewise, part of negotiating the influence of the audience is accusing 
the other of being influenced by the audience. Each reference to the people at home also 
works as a final explicit reference to the audience with whom she has been attempting to 
create solidarity with through her use of “no-nonsense” demands. 
Returning to our concept of the meso-level, it seems that the potential duality of the 
participant roles in this context means that the role choices are significantly performative. 
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There exists a blurred line between the professional and political performance, and the extent 
to which participants are doing one or the other provides an opportunity for ideological work 
to take place. Attempts to do political disagreement (i.e., the ideological work) is undertaken 
on professional grounds and professional disagreement likewise can be targeted as politically 
motivated. It is the ambiguous nature of a listening audience which allows for the 
interactional tension between the political and professional and for the parallel ideological 
contest, too. Next, we will take a look into how contrasting disagreement practices within an 
interaction are mobilised to negotiate role expectations. 
 
5.2 Excerpt B: “You’re quite right you know” 
 
Disagreement may be both exploited and mitigated by policy participants in attempts to do 
ideological work. Marra’s (2012) research has shown that the mitigation of disagreement can 
be important for maintaining workplace relationships as it can function to acknowledge 
interlocutors’ face needs. Whilst a different context, we can explore how participants to the 
policy process engage with expectations of workplace interaction in order to construct 
perceptions of interactional complicity and by extension professionalism. In this excerpt, 
McMorrin, a member of the Environmental Audit Select Committee and a Labour Party MP, 
employs leading questions that incite moral disagreement in an attempt to depict this policy 
issue as a moral problem. Tolhurst, in a very different strategy to the one we saw her adopt in 
the previous excerpt, mitigates her disagreement with McMorrin’s moral premising by 
complying with the bounds of the question. She does this to avoid McMorrin’s political bait 
in her attempts to construe the problem as a moral one. Simultaneously, the mitigated nature 
with which she has managed disagreement indexes notions of moral maturity and 
professionalism in interaction, which are important to the credence of her ideological work in 
reducing the role of morality in the definition of this policy problem. Consequently, by 
expressing an attempt to avoid disagreement, she is decidedly apolitical in her response so as 










































can  I  just  ask  err  minister  tolhurst  (.)  um I d-don’t  (.)  going  back  to er  
slavery  in  supply  chains  a:nd  the  need  for  legislation (.)  here (.)  I  mean  
(.)  businesses  we  know  businesses  are  required  to  publish  a  statement  
saying  what  they  (.)  are  doing  to  address  slavery (.)  in  supply chains  (.)  
but  technically  a  business  could  publish (.)  a  slavery  statement  saying  
we’re  not  doing  anything  (.) and  they’re  still  compliant↑ (.) with  the  
transparency  element  within  that  (.)  within  that  act  (1)  don’t  you  think  
we  need  that  tougher  legislation↓ =  
=((Disagreement between Atkins, a conservative minister and witness, and 
McMorrin about whether this is a question for Tolhurst or Atkins)) 
well  I  I  er  think  what  we’ve  probably  outlined  and  the  fact  that  
there’s    three  Ministers  here  from  three  different  departments  is  that  
a  lot  of  these  issues  that  affect  u::m  you  know  if  we’re  not just the 
textile industry but  er business and employment across the country  
crosses↓  er  crosses   the departments within government that’s why we (.) 
do try and work together er  and we  we  all come together on certain 
elements  (.)  umm  absolutely  when  w:e  u:m  I  mean  er  the minister  














































information about that particular  that  particular   area  of   um  area  of 
legislation (.)  but  um  it is quite right  that  we  y’know  one of the things 
that we obviously we’re what the work we’re doing around corporate 
governance a:nd  er  really  expecting businesses to set up  step up to what 
their shareholders and the wider public expect (.)  umm  whe:re and and 
y’know I can speak and it’s quite right and I  speak  I think I speak for all 
ministers when I say when (.) er legislation isn’t working we’re always 
review that and make sure that we er change it  where necessary  to get the 
right outcome  u:m  so  but  you’re you’re quite right you know we uh the 
public expect companies to be transparent  u:m  and we:’re working with 
business to to to bring that (.) [forward] 
                                                               [but]  you  could  actually  introduce  
regulation (.)  to  make  it  more  transparent  because  I’ve just highlighted 
where that act is actually  broken where businesses can get away from it er 
away with it um (.)  a  simple requirement could be that you  that  brands 
declare the source of raw material used so you  actually  see (.) the steps 
and where where  the supply chains (.) are (2) could you not do that↑= 
                                                                                                                          =well 
it’s an interesting  er  an  interesting  [suggestion] 
                                                                   [well that’s]  that’s  been highlighted (.)  
previously I’m surprised  that  y’know being  (.)  six  months  in  the  role (.)  
you  haven’t (.) looked at  looked  at  any↑  of  this   in  your↑  role= 
 
McMorrin directs questions (lines 1-8 and 37-42) at Tolhurst which ask for legislation, i.e., 
policy work, on the implicit basis of businesses being potentially morally corrupt. This is 
most evident in the rationale that she gives for her questions. For example, in lines 5-6, the 
use of the conditional “could” suggests that businesses might want to avoid policing slavery 
within their businesses and supply chains. She also presents the apparent flaw in the 
regulation through presenting “business” as the agent, thus positioning businesses as 
potentially exploitative of the flaw, rather than merely benefiting from it. Likewise, in lines 
39-40, “Get away […] with it” is an even more indicative positioning of businesses as 
morally corrupt, and the correction from “from it” to “with it” highlights this; “get away with 
it” obviously carries much stronger, potentially criminal, connotations of morality. By 
claiming the moral corruptibility of businesses, McMorrin implies they cannot be trusted to 
maintain workers’ rights by their own devices and thus stronger legislation is necessary. Her 
questions can be seen as particularly leading due to their implicit moral prefaces. 
Specifically, in lines 5-6, the positioning of businesses as potentially morally corrupt 
functions to make her question in lines 7-8 appear morally driven. We assume by a principle 
of relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1986) that she asks the question in lines 7-8 because 
businesses are morally corrupt; however, she does not state a causal link between the 
question she asks and her prefacing. The negative rhetorical device “don’t you think” in line 
7 in conjunction with the drop in intonation at the end of the utterance (line 8) changes the 
nature of the communicative act; the question does not solicit information or an alternative 
view, but confirmation of McMorrin’s moral reasoning (Ehrlich and Freed 2010). 
The “leading” nature of the question can be seen as encouraging Tolhurst to engage in 
disagreement and present an alternative moral reasoning; we can reasonably assume that 
McMorrin is aware that Tolhurst does not share the view that this is a moral issue which 
consequently requires further legislation, given Tolhurst’s prior positioning up until now 
during the hearing. Therefore, she is unlikely to solicit the confirmation demanded by the 
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question. It also co-opts Tolhurst into an interactional position defined by morality by 
referentially placing her as an interactant who is not only relevant to this moral problem but 
is someone who has a say on it. In absence of any justification, asking Tolhurst this question 
has the effect of answering McMorrin’s moral preface question by positioning Tolhurst 
interactionally as a relevant moral judge through implicating that she is someone who is 
either capable or required to be making a moral judgement. Her position becomes not just as 
a witness to the inquiry, but as a moral witness. This has more significance than just 
positioning these interlocutors in relation to the issue, but it implicates the nature of the 
audience and the interlocutors’ relationship to this audience. As the voting public to a 
political interaction will always be the ultimate judges of moral issues, to make this a moral 
issue is to suggest a broader, lay audience, over a more specific, perhaps technical one. 
McMorrin’s prefacing also references the interlocutors as acting moral judges for the 
audience. Thus, Tolhurst has been challenged not only to present alternative moral reasoning, 
but by extension to respond to the nature of the audience which McMorrin has pictured as 
relevant to their interaction and their relationship to the audience as interlocutors.  
Tolhurst does indeed disagree with McMorrin and provides alternative moral 
reasoning to imply that they are not moral judges, and that this is not a moral interaction. She 
positions the market (“public” and “shareholders”) as the capable moral judge (lines 29-30 
and 34-35) and implies that the moral corruptibility of business is irrelevant given that the 
market ensures that businesses police modern slavery. Furthermore, in lines 32-33 she 
implies that her disagreement is not  on the basis of a reluctance to enact legislation but on 
the basis of moral grounds; the market can regulate businesses and there is no need for 
greater government control. In this way, she denies that they are talking as moral judges on 
behalf of the audience as McMorrin implies, but rather that the audience are their own moral 
judges. Furthermore, her two references “the public expect” in lines 30 and 35 could also be 
interpreted as a subtle rejection of the notion of a listening public audience. However, 
Tolhurst employs multiple linguistic strategies to mitigate her disagreement. Firstly, she uses 
“expect” three times to show solidarity with McMorrin’s suggestion that businesses are 
capable of moral corruption and in doing so does not directly disagree with McMorrin’s 
moral reasoning. Furthermore, repeated markers of agreement such as “absolutely” (line 24), 
“you’re quite right” (line 34), “it’s quite right” (lines 27, 31) purport that agreement with 
McMorrin’s moral reasoning is happening here, or at least that she is not questioning the 
moral basis of her argument. In particular, using “right” three times here is interesting 
because of its moral connotations; not only does “it’s quite right” mark agreement, but it 
suggests moral agreement or at least willingness to continue talking around the issue within a 
moral axis. Consequently, this acts to deny the existence of a moral problem at all. Thus, 
whilst conducting ideological disagreement on moral grounds, Tolhurst’s use of linguistic 
features and communicative acts used to express the disagreement often appear to “do” 
agreement. 
This strategy can be seen to add credence to her position by suggesting a maturity that 
perhaps McMorrin’s leading question does not have. Her mitigation of disagreement 
represents an acknowledgement of the positive face needs (Brown and Levinson 1987) of 
McMorrin and in doing so she plays the professional role of the witness; accepting the 
bounds of the question is important to look like you are doing rightly what a witness is 
expected to do, whilst effort is made to couch any kind of substantive ideological 
disagreement deep within her interactional means of agreement. Maturity in interaction is 
itself a morally ground concept, so for Tolhurst to do disagreement within perceived morally 
mature bounds frames her as a quality moral judge in her capability to decide that morality is 
in fact not relevant to this policy issue. Thus her delivery of almost ‘non-disagreement’ 
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carries with it social meaning that passes commentary on her ideological position. In this 
way, mitigation of disagreement is not just because she does not want disagreement to occur, 
but because of what it represents about her moral competence, her interactive competence, 
and by extension the competence of her arguments. 
However, in avoiding taking the political “bait”, Tolhurst’s mitigation of 
disagreement, perhaps ironically, causes its own tensions. After a similar repeated strategy 
from McMorrin in lines 37-42, again inciting disagreement (notably through “could you not 
do that”), Tolhurst no longer attempts to make any mitigated disagreement, but rather 
demonstrates a lack of willingness even to engage with McMorrin’s challenge (lines 43-44). 
This can be seen as a refusal to play the political game, and as a result McMorrin takes direct 
attack on Tolhurst’s professional role (lines 45-47) which she has been “hiding behind” to 
avoid political debate. 
Tolhurst’s attempt to construct moral maturity through mitigating disagreement, in 
contrast to McMorrin’s attempts to make the issue at hand one of moral disagreement in its 
requirement of policy action, represent deliberately alternative interpretations of role 
expectations. The former indexing notions of a professional identity and the latter of a 
political one with the intention of making the problem at hand either a professional, or a 
political one. As a result, the interactional strategies are significant in light of the potential 
effect that they could have in determining the ideological framing of the policy issue at hand; 
this is the bottom line for these two participants whose interactional goals are to socially 





The extent to which disagreement is expected in the creation of public policy is so much so 
that it is fundamental to the enactment of the role performance of the political policy maker 
in this event. More specifically, the extent and ways in which policy makers decide to engage 
or look to be engaging in disagreement is a resource available to them in order to discursively 
define which interactional roles are relevant to the policy issue at hand. The political 
significance given to disagreement within the policy context is the indexical link through 
which an issue is given relevance in the definition of policy because disagreement is so 
inherently tied up with the professional performance of political beings. As a consequence of 
this, disagreement becomes a resource for participants in the policy context to index whether 
an issue at hand is a policy issue or not. It carries notions of political performance to such an 
extent that it (or mitigation thereof) becomes a resource for appearing political or not, and 
likewise for making issues political or not. This performance of the professional political 
roles potentially available to the participants in this space is itself core to the ideological 
regulation of policy, and management of disagreement is integral in this performative act. In 
this way, there exists significant tension around whether disagreement should itself be there 
or not, making “disagreement about disagreement” a common and highly performative act in 
the event. Because the primary demand of the policy process is the definition of whether 
certain issues should even be the focus of policy changes or not, the extent to which we can 
distinguish policy making professionals from political beings is highly constructive in the 
ideological definition of the policy issue at play. The ideological game at hand becomes one 
of exploiting or suppressing disagreement, with the intention of negotiating which issues are 
relevant to which aspects of the participants’ roles. The irony of this is that disagreement is 




This is a process by which political beings indicate their ideological orientation 
towards certain issues for the benefit of an overhearing audience. Disagreement’s enactment 
(or lack of), therefore, goes beyond the interactional situated context; it has wider 
consequences for macro and micro party politics as it is a process whereby politicians decide 
which specific issues are important in defining their ideological mandate for the benefit of 
their audience. Disagreement, role performance, ideology and audience as a result become 
entangled concepts in which their indexical relationships are so intertwined that it is difficult 
to apply our preconceptions of them from their standalone theoretical backgrounds. 
Accordingly, the place and function of disagreement in the meso-level of the policy 
inquiry hearing becomes contested ground because of the hybridisation of political and 
professional expectations. In the situated interactional context, particularly in the inquiry-
witness dynamic, complicity and maturity are important, but the increasing accessibility of a 
potentially unlimited audience to the inquiry carries with it political expectations of 
disagreement. Disagreement is institutionalised for participants to “do” policy and areas of 
“political responsibility” need to be both interactionally and ideologically disagreed upon by 
the participants in order to meet the societal expectations of professional politicians’ overall 
linguistic behaviours. 
Disagreement is critical in the determining of which roles are relevant to which 
aspects of this event, but it is the ideological implications of whether certain issues are of 
professional or political importance that makes disagreement so ideologically performative 
here. This is demonstrated particularly by the fact that the same speakers adopt seemingly 
contradictory performances within the same hearing (Tolhurst, for example, in Excerpts A 
and B). It is this continued variation between disagreement practice in the political and 
professional performances of actors, as well as the professional and political expectations that 
they demand of one another, that allow for disagreement to be so ideologically constructive 
and challenging. Such dynamism is characteristic of this event and is what makes 
interactional practices here so ideologically potent. 
What is particularly significant in this political meso-level is the extent to which the 
roles of the speakers are themselves significant in terms of the ideas that are being discussed, 
because politicians are, by definition, vicarious advocates for ideological groups on certain 
issues and are thus symbolic representations of specific ideologies. We would argue that 
every potential role in an interaction is such; however, politicians are the ultimate example of 
this because their very existence depends on it. Thus, disagreement between two politicians is 
itself symbolic of the difference between ideas. In this way, disagreement in policy making 
about substantive issues relevant to policy through the interactional negotiation of roles is a 
fundamental mechanism by which policy is ideologically/socially defined. Crucially, 
however, such disagreements are made in the name and on behalf of an audience. Politicians, 
therefore, do not disagree on behalf of themselves or even on behalf of ideologies, but 
importantly on behalf of ideologically-defined audiences. 
The usefulness of an audience design framing, however, goes further than explaining 
that interaction is given ideological meaning because of the nature of the audience. The 
dynamic relationship between speaker variation and audience is one that helps us understand 
how the speakers can also actively shape the relationship with, and also the existence of, an 
audience in a context where this relationship is still novel and ambiguous. Principally, we are 
referring to the referee design aspect of Bell’s (1984) audience design framework and referee 
design addition (2001), including persons significant for the speaker but physically absent. 
This allows for scoping how speaker choices are not just responsive to but also initiative of 
an audience or rather in engaging certain aspects of it over others. Broadcast talk theorists, 
according to Montgomery (2007), have well expanded on how interlocutors claim 
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communicative entitlement for their interactional positions through reference to the audience. 
They have also long realised how interlocutors choose to interact in order to potentially 
generate further audiences (the typical example being a provocative news anchor). However, 
when interactional roles are politically precarious, and the nature of the audience is also 
particularly uncertain, the initiative nature of audience design becomes particularly apparent. 
In this case, defining who the relevant audience is becomes incredibly important for the 
production of interactional positions and vice versa as the performance of interactional 
positions implicates, and by consequence may even generate, certain factions of an audience. 
This is part of the benefit of research into the meso-space of the select committee hearing; 
that brings to the fore the initiative aspect of audience design and highlights how it is as much 
an ideologically renewing process as it is an ideologically dependent one. 
The social enactment of particular policy problems is not simply a reflection of the 
audience watching, as this contains multiple potential groupings of sub-audiences divided 
according to ideological lines regarding their beliefs on the policy issues at hand. The 
performative act of disagreement practice works to engage certain factions of the audience, 
by imbuing certain issues with political relevance to the inquiry over others. The success of 
engaging audiences around certain issues over others may often only be seen in subsequent 
stakeholder responses, as the framing of these issues begins to contribute to macro level 
discourses. In this way, meso-level events can also be defined by their dynamic multiplicity 
of audiences which allows for the disagreement variation to be so constructive of the 
relationship with the audience through its ideological work. We attempt to capture the 
interaction between different audiences, current or future, present or absent, in figure 1.  
Demasi (2016, 68) has recognised this dynamic as a “multi-axial communicative 
environment” in which interaction between participants in political debate is also interaction 
with multiple audiences, and these interactions are all interrelated, multi-directional and 
performative. The framework below attempts to capture the interrelationships between the 
interactional roles of the policy context and audience; the existence and nature of these 
constituent parts is fundamentally dependent upon one another and these interrelationships 




















































Fig.1 Disagreement and audience design 
 
This model gives disagreement a central role in interpreting the relationship between 
audience and interaction within the public inquiry context. It is, evidently, an abstraction and 
simplification which aims to show the ideological projection of role performance in the event 
we are interested in. Fundamentally, the interdependencies between the professional roles of 
the participants in a political encounter not as scripted as parliament and the audience’s 
expectations are co-constitutive in and through the disagreement act. We discuss this further 





Politicians are expected to disagree in order to align in their roles as politicians. Whilst they 
might not be aligning ideologically in relation to policy issues, they are “working together" to 
enact their policy roles at times which practically means agreeing to disagree as the main 
modus operandi of managing policy arenas, such as the public inquiry context. However, the 
changing nature of policy making domains which tie in with these expectations about roles 
and performance have an impact upon the construction of ideologies themselves. That talk is 




















define policy. Not only do the participants have to negotiate new or changing communicative 
domains, but their communicative ability and decision-making in light of these dynamic 
contexts can have profound consequences for the output of the policy process itself as well as 
its perceived societal role. It is perhaps axiomatic to suggest that the mechanisms of policy 
contribute to the nature of policy, but meso-level events present an analytical opportunity to 
map the symbiotic relationship between communicative practices/semiotic processes and 
policy-making.  
Our paper has addressed the role and function of disagreement in the under-
researched UK public inquiry ecosystem. We hope we pave the way for future studies in 
contexts where disagreement is ideologically driven, and therefore, a critical, political view is 
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